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er debtors from Chapter 11 coverage.
The Court disagreed with the
lower court's opinion that allowing
consumer debtors to proceed under Chapter 11 would flood the
bankruptcy courts with reorganization plans. First, the cost and complexity of filing under Chapter 11
acts as a deterrent. Second, bankruptcy courts have the discretion
to dismiss Chapter 11 cases if
debtors do not have workable reorganization plans.
The Court also refused to adopt
the argument that extending Chapter 11 to consumer debtors would
run contrary to Congress's intent
to prevent involuntary bankruptcy
proceedings under Chapter 13.
Congress's concern regarding
Chapter 13 was that forcing a
debtor, whose future wages were
not exempt from the bankruptcy
estate, into bankruptcy proceedings would violate the Thirteenth
Amendment's protection against
involuntary servitude. However,
because Chapter 11 has no provision requiring a debtor to pay
future wages to a creditor, the
Court found the involuntary servitude concern irrelevant to Chapter
11 proceedings.
The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens' dissent stated
that a complete reading of the
statute revealed no congressional
intent to allow individual consumer debtors to reorganize under
Chapter 11. The dissent relied on
repeated references to business in
both Chapter 11 language and the
legislative history and also the difference between the chapter titles
(Chapter 11 entitled "Reorganization" contrasted with Chapter 13
entitled "Adjustment of Debts of
an Individual with Regular Income").
Further, the dissent noted that
just because the statute states only
a person eligible as a debtor under
Chapter 7 may be a debtor under
Chapter 11, it cannot be inferred
that every person eligible under
Chapter 7 is eligible under Chapter
11.
Finally, the dissent stated that
individual consumer debtors could
be forced into bankruptcy by creditors, since involuntary proceedings
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could be instituted under Chapters
7 and 11. If an individual consumer debtor filed under Chapter 11,
as allowed by the majority opinion,
a creditor could begin involuntary
proceedings against the debtor.
The dissent found such proceedings inconsistent with Congress's
protection of the same class of
creditors under Chapter 13.
Stacy Feldman

The United States
Supreme Court
Enforces A
Non-Negotiated Forum
Selection Clause On A
Cruise Ship Ticket
In Carnival Cruise Lines v.
Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991), the
United States Supreme Court held
that a non-negotiated forum selection clause, located on the back of a
cruise ticket, was enforceable. The
Court also held that this clause did
not take away the passengers' right
to a trial by a court of competent
jurisdiction as required by The
Limitation of Vessel Owners Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. App. 183c.
Background
Mr. and Mrs. Shute ("Shutes")
were residents of Washington
state. They purchased tickets for a
cruise on a ship owned by petitioners, Carnival Cruise Lines ("Carnival"), headquartered in Miami,
Florida. The reverse side of the
tickets contained a forum selection
clause typed in fine print. This
clause provided that all disputes
with Carnival were to be litigated
in a Florida court. Additionally, it
stated that by accepting the ticket,
the purchaser was deemed to have
agreed to all of its terms and
conditions.
While on the cruise, Mrs. Shute
was injured when she slipped on a
deck mat. This accident occurred
when the ship was located in international waters off the coast of
Mexico. The Shutes filed suit
against Carnival in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Washington, alleg-

ing that Mrs. Shute's injuries were
the result of negligence on the part
of Carnival and its employees.
Carnival responded by contending that the forum selection clause
on the Shutes' tickets dictated that
the suit should have been filed in a
Florida court. Alternatively, Carnival asserted that the district
court lacked personal jurisdiction
over the cruise line because its
contacts with the State of Washington were insubstantial. The district
court granted Carnival's summary
judgment motion, holding that the
cruise line's contacts with Washington were constitutionally insufficient to support the exercise of
personal jurisdiction.
The Ninth Circuit's Decision
The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court's ruling for two reasons.
First, the Ninth Circuit determined that the cruise line's solicitation of business in Washington
was sufficient contact to justify the
district court's exercise of personal
jurisdiction. Second, the court, relying on The Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972)
("The Bremen"), agreed with the
Shutes' argument that the forum
selection clause was unenforceable
because it was not freely bargained
for. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit refused to enforce the clause
based on evidence that the Shutes
were physically and financially incapable of pursuing the litigation
in Florida. Thus, the enforcement
of the clause would deprive them
of their day in court and contravene the Supreme Court's holding
in The Bremen.
Carnival appealed to the United
States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court's Decision
The Supreme Court examined
the Ninth Circuit's analysis of The
Bremen, since both parties relied
on that case as support for their
arguments.
In The Bremen, the Supreme
Court addressed the enforceability
of a forum selection clause in a
contract between two business corporations. The case discussed a
number of factors that made enforcement of such a clause reason(continued on page 30)
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able and stated that, absent any
fraud or undue influence, a forum
selection clause was valid. After
analyzing the Ninth Circuit's application of The Bremen, the Court
concluded that the lower court had
ignored important differences in a
contract between businesses and a
contract between a consumer and a
business.
The Court began by rejecting the
Ninth Circuit's conclusion that a
non-negotiated forum selection
clause was never enforceable because it was not the subject of
bargaining. Instead, the Court stated that this particular clause was
permissible for several reasons.
First, because of the likelihood that
its passengers would be from many
locales, Carnival had a special interest in limiting the geographical
locations of courts in which it
potentially could be sued. Second,
the clause establishing the forum
for any future litigation had the
beneficial effect of dispelling any
confusion about where the dispute
must be brought and defended.
This certainty spared time, expense, and judicial resources. Finally, the Court reasoned that
when the cruise line limited the
courts in which it could be sued, it
saved money which was passed on
to the passengers in the form of
reduced fares.
Next, the Court addressed the
Shutes' assertion that litigating
their claim in Florida would be
inconvenient. The Court noted
that here, as in The Bremen, the
party claiming inconvenience had
a heavy burden of proof. Using this
standard, the Court found that the
Shutes did not meet the burden
needed to set aside a forum selection clause on the grounds of inconvenience. Since the district
court made no findings of fact
regarding physical and financial
impediments derived from litigation in Florida, the Ninth Circuit's
conclusion of inconvenience had
no basis in the record and, therefore, was not valid.
The Court also found that the
Ninth Circuit misinterpreted the
statement in The Bremen that, "the
serious inconvenience of the con30

tractual forum to one or both of the
parties might carry greater weight
in determining the reasonableness
of the forum clause." 407 U.S. at
17. The Court noted that this statement contemplated a hypothetical
agreement between two Americans
to resolve their local disputes in a
remote, alien forum. In the instant
case, however, Florida was not a
remote forum nor was the dispute
an essentially local one, since Mrs.
Shute was injured in international
waters. Therefore, the litigation
was not inherently more suited to
resolution in the state of Washington than Florida.
The Court then determined that
the forum selection clause was fair;
it found no evidence that Carnival
selected Florida as the forum in an
attempt to discourage passengers
from pursuing legitimate claims.
The Court based this conclusion
on the facts that Carnival's principal place of business was Florida
and that many of its cruises departed from and returned to Florida
ports. Similarly, the Court found
no evidence indicating that Carnival obtained the passengers' approval of the forum selection
clause by fraud.
Finally, the Court addressed the
Shutes' contention that enforcement of the clause violated 46
U.S.C. App. 183c, which proscribes a right to trial by a court of
competent jurisdiction. The forum
selection clause, the Court noted,
specifically designated that all actions be brought in a Florida court.
Since Florida courts are courts of
competent jurisdiction, no violation of 46 U.S.C. App. 183c existed.
The Dissenting Opinion
In their dissenting opinion, Justices Stevens and Marshall concluded that the forum selection
clause should not be enforceable
since passengers did not have notice of the clause until after they
purchased the tickets. Further, the
dissenters concluded that, even if
the passengers had received prominent notice of the forum selection
clause before they committed to
the cost of the cruise, the clause
was void under The Limitation of
Vessel Owners Liability Act, 46
U.S.C. App. 183C, which invali-

dates express limitations on a shipowner's liability for negligence.
Further, traditional admiralty law
prohibits exculpatory clauses in
passenger tickets because they are
typically the product of disparate
bargaining power between the carrier and the passenger and undermine the strong public interest in
deterring negligent conduct.
Kathrine Schmitt Hilder

Expert Testimony
Required To Prove
Negligent Approval of
Fraudulent Credit Card
Application
In Beard, et aL v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Company, et al., 587 A.2d
195 (D.C. 1991), the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals held
that, due to lack of expert testimony as to the standard of care in the
retail industry, a consumer had
failed to show negligence on the
part of merchants approving unauthorized credit card applications in
his name. The court further found
that the consumer had no cause of
action under consumer protection
regulations requiring retail sellers
to register with the Office of Consumer Protection because no actual injury occurred.
Background
Ms. Roberts ("Roberts"), a former girlfriend of Eugene Beard
("Beard"), applied for and obtained credit cards in his name
from several department stores.
The department store companies
included May Department Stores,
Inc. ("Hecht's"), Saks Fifth Avenue, Inc., and Woodward & Lothrop, Inc. among others.
This case began as a debt collection suit brought by Hecht's
against both Beard and Roberts.
Beard counterclaimed against
Hecht's and the other department
stores that issued fraudulent credit
cards in his name, or jointly in his
and Roberts' names. He argued
that the cards had been issued
negligently without verification of
the application information. Beard
claimed no knowledge of or conVolume 4 Number 1/Fall, 1991

